



In this paper, I set out to achieve two things. First, 
I attempt to show that, although Prof. Wiredu's 'influential 
and importanU book, Philosophy and an African Culture, 
is a collection of papers some of which, as one reviewer 
puts it, 'were intended for conferences and journals of 
disparate themes1l, it is not, as the reviewer suggests, 'just 
a cluster of opinions put together1.2 I suggest that a central 
concern runs through the whole collection and that the 
divergence in the preoccupations of each of the papers is 
more apparent than real. Second, I endeavour to show that, 
in discussing the different aspects of his preoccupation in 
Philosophy and an African Culture, Prof. Wiredu does not 
advocate 'logical positivism as a model of philosophical 
thinking to help solve the problems of contemporary African 
Culture'.3 All he does, I argue, is to underscore the role 
of Critical Philosophy in the solution of the African problem 
of self - identification and the achievement in Africa of 
'true' development, i.e. development in all facets of life. 
In so doing he emphasizes the relevance of philosophical 
inquiries, however abstract, to practical issues in human 
life. It is precisely because of this emphasis on the connection 
between theoretical concerns in philosophy and practical 
issues that I see Philosophy and an African Culture as a 
good exemplification of that model of philosophy - the 
Socratic model - that puts philosophical inquiry in the service 
of human needs; hence the title of this paper. 
In arguing these claims, let us begin with the three 
complaints which Wiredu, in the opening chapter of his book, 
says can afflict a society. 'They are', to quote him, 
'anachronism, authoritarianism and supernaturalism1.4 What 
does Wiredu mean by each of these terms? Anachronism, 
he says, is 'the failure to perceive anachronistic things for 
what they are and to discard or modify them as the case 
may require'. 5 To suggest that a thing or practice is 
anachronistic, then, is to suggest that it has outlasted its 
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suitability, and that ~t is no more adequate for the goals 
it, originally, was designed to serve. Authoritarianism, 
on the other hand, is defined as the 'mjustified overriding 
of an individual's will1.6 To say of any human arrangement 
that it is authoritarian, therefore, is to say that it does 
not allow individuals the freedom to make 'deliberate, rational 
choices' among alternatives, whether in relation to theoretical 
positions on any issue or in relation to practical choices 
in the realm of action. Finally, supernaturalism is the point 
of view which sees 'rules, policies and action' as emanations 
from 'some supernatural source' - God, for example. 
However, it is Wiredu's criticism of authoritarianism 
which holds together the various strands of thought in his 
book. In his critique of Marxism, or even his conception 
of philosophy and what it can do for Africa, Wiredu emphasizes 
the need to guard against authoritarianism in human social 
relations. His is a sustained attack on a dogmatic 
(unscientific) attitude which, at the purely theoretical level, 
can only generate intellectual errors that befuddle, rather 
than clarify, thought and, at the practical (political) level, 
leads to political intolerance. My suggestion in this paper 
is that this sustained attack on authoritarian tendencies, 
apart from serving as the 'common thread' which runs through 
most of the articles, also serves to underpin Wiredu's ardent 
belief that philosophical issues, however abstract, are relevant 
to practical issues affecting human life. It is this unyielding 
commitment to an intellectual orientation which puts 
knowledge in the service of human development that qualifies 
the essays in Philosophy and an African Culture as a good 
example of a humanistic philosophy. 
Let us begin to give flesh to our exposition by clarifying 
how Wiredu tackles his fight against intolerance and the 
'persecution and suppression of dissent' in the various issues 
that are discussed in his book. These issues, as I have just 
hinted in the preceding paragraph, include the following: 
(i) his conception of philosophy and what it can do for Africa; 
(ii) his critique of Marxism; and (iii) his position on truth 
and knowledge. 
In his attack on authoritarianism we see Wiredu 
emphasizing the importance of reason to human survival. 
'Reason', he writes, 'is what ought to decide between 
alternatives, and the disinclination to entertain questions 
about the reasons behind an established practice or institution 
is the sure mark of the authoritarian meRtaUty17 This 
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disinclination to reason may be attributed to a number of 
reasons. It may, in some cases, be attributed to tradition. 
This is usually the case in those societies, particularly 
traditional societies, in which conformity to social norms 
is stressed at the expense of individual initiatives, and in 
which certain institutions and people command unquestioning 
obedience, because they are seen as being versed in the 
wisdom of the age. The disinclination to reason may, at 
other times, be due to commitment to a set of beliefs which 
are thought to provide the only authentic path to the 
realisation of certain societal ideals. It may even be a 
practical manifestation of certain positiofls on such theoretical 
issues as the nature of Philosophy and the nature of truth. 
Wiredu, in his essays, not only gives us interesting insights 
into the nature of some of these sources of authoritarian 
tendencies and their effects on human development, he 
also offers suggestions as to how this authoritarian mentality 
can be fought, both in practical and theoretical terms. 
In demonstrating how he goes about this task in his 
book, we may allow charity to begin at home by considering 
the specific case of Africa .where the authoritarian mentality 
is easily noticeable. In traditional African societies, for 
example, this authoritarian trait was manifested in the 
unquestioning obedience to the authority of elders who were 
thought to be repositories of knowledge and wisdom. In 
these societies, little 'premium was placed on curiosity in 
those of tender age, or independence of thought in those 
of more considerable years1.8 The tendency of some 
contemporary African leaders to see themselves as having 
the right answers to all societal problems may, given the 
fact that traditional beliefs still have some influence on 
beliefs and attitudes in contemporary African societies, 
justifiably be regarded as an unhappy left - over of the 
authoritarian streak in traditional culture. When we add 
to this the fact that ideology, in many African States, is 
understood in the 'degenerate sense' - i.e. the sense in which 
it is taken to mean 'a set of dogmas to be imposed by 
governments as the exclusive basis for. political organisation 
of society19 - then it should not be diffict,11. t to understand 
the reason why, in Africa, it has been very difficult to secure 
'such conditions as shall permit the self - realis.ation of men 
as rational beings1.lO 
But what could have encouraged the· interpretation 
of ideology in this degenerate sense? The cause, Wiredu 
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suggests, should be located in the failure to realise that 
conceptions of truth, beauty and goodness are personal, 
and consequently, 
If I punish another for not adhering to 
the true, the good, the beautiful, the 
penalty he pays is as a result of not adof:ting 
my opinions, attitudes and preferences. 1 
This failure to acknol1.vedge personal preferences for what 
they are mayb'e, according to Wiredu, one of the reasons 
'why Marxism has tended to lead to authoritarianism1.12 
However, he contends, there is a more fundamental 
explanation for this tendency of Marxism to lead to 
authoritarianism. This explanation is given in terms of the 
'authoritarian trait' in the Marxist doctrine itself, a trait 
which, he suggests, can 'be traced to the conception of 
philosophy to be found in Marx and English113 - i.e., the 
ideological conception of philosophy. In his critique of 
Marxism, Wiredu is at pains to show the dangers to philosophy, 
and the practical consequences e>f this conception of 
philosophy. For him, the ideological class conception of 
philosophy, apart from harbouring certain theoretical 
confusions which Marxists cannot see because of their 
partisanship, also leads to intolerance of the worst kind. 
Yet it is not only a misconception of the nature of 
ideology or of philosophy that can generate authoritarian 
tendencies in a society; our interpretation of the nature 
of a fundamental concept such as truth can also promote 
worsening interaction within the society. If an individual 
considers the truth which he happens to espouse on a given 
issue to be 'ineluctable and final', then such an individual 
may want, quite naturally, to use any means at his disposal 
to make those who hold antithetic points of view to conform. 
Thus, apart from the fine logical and epistemological 
arguments he advances to show that the humanistic theory 
of truth is to be preferred to the objectivist theory, which 
radically separates truth from opinion and, ~onsequently, 
makes truth an eternal verity, Wiredu also provides a 
humanistic argument which is supposed to reinforce his 
logical and epistemological arguments. He contends: 
Recognition that truth necessarily involves 
a point of view should lead one to reflect 
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that the 'truths' which one happens to 
espouse are not ineluctable and final, 
and that opposite points of view celebrating 
opposite 'truths' are in themselves neither 
evidence of insincerity nor proof of stupidity 
••• 15 
This far, Wiredu's philosophy can be seen to be diagnostic 
and therapeutic. It is diagnostic to the extent that it attempts 
in a very p8Jnstaking manner to expose the sources of the 
authoritarian mentality which is a hinderance to the 
development of satisfactory human relations; and therapeutic 
because he advocates a kind of intellectual attitude that 
can elim~nate this hinderance. In all this, Wiredu stresses 
the importance of reason to human survival. In this 
connection, he 'passionately argues for a conception of 
philosophy that is pluralistic, self-critical and open-minded, 
i.e. one which is the very opposite o( dogmatism and 
authoritarianism or unjustified belief and opinion1.16 In 
other words, he advocates a scientific outlook in philosophy. 
This. conception of philosophy is particularly relevant to 
Africa because: 
The habits of exactness and rigour in 
thinking, the pursuit of systematic 
coherence and the experimental approach 
so characteristic of science are attributes 
of mind which we in Africa urgently need 
to cultivate not just because they are 
themselves intellectual virtues but also 
because they are necessary conditions 
of rapid modernization ••• 17 
The case for a scientific outlook in African philosophical 
activity, then, is based on the understanding that the largely 
unscientific and authoritarian attitude prevalent in African 
traditional societies are no more adequate for the needs 
of contemporary African societies. The argument here 
is that: Since the needs of contemporary African societies 
are given expression in the search for development, the 
key to which 'is science and technology', any philosophy, 
to be in 'touch with the context of contemporary Africa' 
has to be 'thoroughly impregnated' by the scientific spirit.ls 
And the scientific attitude is defined by such. features as 
'freedom of inquiry, openess to criticism, a general type 
of scepticism and fallibilism and non-veneration of 
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authorities1.19 The emphasis Wiredu places on reason and 
his argument for 'the relation between philosophy and African 
culture', rather than being ahistorical, as a critic suggests,20 
is informed by a concrete, indeed historical, interpretation 
of the African condition. This, I suggest, is an interpretation 
that can hardly be contested, given the fact that 
The feeling of racial superiority over 
us which the colonialists had, and their 
achievements which developed in us a 
colonial mentality were due to their 
scientific and technological achievements 
21 ... 
Thus, although Wiredu is of one mind with the logical 
positivists in his insistence that beliefs be rationally grounded, 
and also shares their love of rigour and clarity in philosophical 
analysis, he is markedly different from them in his conception 
of the role of philosophy. Whereas the concern of the logical 
positivists was primarily metaphilosophical, i.e. 'to rid 
Philosophy of fruitless inquiries and disagreements122 -
a purpose for which they formulated a formal criterion of 
demarcation between what is meaningful and what is 
meaningless - Wiredu's preoccupation, in Philosophy and 
an African Culture, is to put philosophy in the service of 
human well-being by subjecting to critical examination the 
intellectual foundations of certain habits of thought which 
impede human development in all its interlocking face ts. 
Thus, rather than see philosophy, as the logical positivists 
were wont to do, simply as a critical activity - an activity 
geared towards the demarcation of that which is cognitively 
significant (meaningful) from that which is not (meaningless) 
- Wiredu sees it as an activity which is both critical and 
constructive. This explains the reason why, although he 
considers it an urgent task of African philosophers to promote 
in Africa a scientific outlook, he also urges them to be 
sensitive 'to the specifics of the African situation', by making 
it their 'particular responsibility •.• to research into their 
traditional background of philosophical thought1.23 For 
Wiredu, then, clarification, rather than being an end in itself, 
is a means to an end - that of bringing philosophical activity 
to 'bear upon human problems, so as to liberalize and humanise 
and, in a word, enrich life1.24 
Given these considerations, it becomes very difficult 
to see the sense in which Wiredu can be said to advocate 
'logical positivism as an model of philosophical thinking 
to help solve the problems qf contemporary African culture.•25 
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For, as we have seen, a distinctive mark of his Philosophy 
is that he sees, like John Dewey, but quite unlike the logical 
positivists, the connection between philosophical inquires 
and practical issues in human life, thereby acknowledging 
the humanistic essence of the philosophic enterprise. What 
he advocates is not the kind of unnecessarily tough-minded 
('technocratic') intellectual outlook characteristic of the 
logical positivists, but an intellectual orientation that 
recognises the human essence of fundamental concepts such 
as 'truth', 'beauty', 'goodness', and thus strives to define 
them 'in terms of the basic needs and capabilities of human 
beings1.26 His central argument is that it is only this kind 
of intellectual orientation that can ensure even development 
and mutual understanding in human societies. 
Wiredu's philosophy, a glimpse of whjch we have in 
Philosophy and an African Culture is therefore humanistic 
because it puts knowledge in the service of mankind. And 
by being able to show the connection between abstract 
philosophical issues such as the question of the meaning 
of truth and practical issues, and the question of the 
relationship between ideology and development, he 
demonstrates both the centrality of philosophy to any 
academic programme that is geared towards the attainment 
of a humane society, and the compatibility of commitment 
to the realisation of certain human ideals with a high degree 
of theoretical finesse. Philosophy and an African Culture 
is, in many respects, 'an adequate characterization and a 
good example' of one type of philosophy that is relevant 
to human needs. It is a shining example of humanistic 
scholarship.* 
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